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fact may have been misinterpreted or a connection with a broader context 
overlooked. Part I of this paper attempts to show that this approach can 
free us from the awkward philosophical questions that are generated by 
the self-ascription of meaning and understanding. It performs this task by 
arguing that our general accuracy in such judgments is  not a fact to be 
explained by  the kind  of philosophical  account described above but is 
instead a condition of our treating a subject as capable of speaking mean-
ingfully or acting with understanding. Although it is tempting to depict 
our proficiency in such judgments as some sort of cognitive achievement, 
such a depiction loses its appeal once we recognize that a collapse in that 
proficiency cannot be regarded as ignorance. Rather a person's being re-
peatedly wrong in such judgments puts in  doubt his or her status as  an 
intelligible agent. Accuracy in our self-ascription of the relevant states is 
interwoven  with  the  possession  of those states  in  such  a manner that, 
when we try to construct a picture of what "ignorance" would be like, we 
find  ourselves excluding not only knowledge  of the  states but also the 
states themselves. 
Part II explores the impact that a failure to recognize these truths has 
had on our understanding of rule-following. Much as ignorance of one's 
own  intentions  undermines  one's  possession  of intentions,  a  certain 
minimal self-transparency  is  a presupposition of a creature's following 
rules and I demonstrate that one of the most popular arguments offered in 
the recent revival of "community views" of rule-following rests squarely 
on a failure to acknowledge this fact. Although presented as proving that 
rule-following only makes sense in  the context of a community, the ar-
gument in question merely shows that anyone we  see as a rule-follower 
must manifest a degree of self-understanding. This realisation dissolves 
the  apparent  tension  between  the  authority  of  individuals  over  the 
meaning of their own utterances and the potentially divergent evidence 
that their use of these utterances provides. Although they may appear to 
be rivals in the interpretation of a person's actions, these two "sources" 
must be in step with each other if we are to see the person as acting mean-
ingfully. Rather than the expression of two incompatible meanings, their 
divergence would signal the breakdown of meaningful action. 
I 
Several  aspects  of our  understanding  of meaning  encourage  the 
notion that meaning is a kind of inner experience. For instance, if I wish 